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Abstract
In  general, mechanisms of direct democracy in Japan are not well established. At  the
national level, the National Referendum Law for the Change of the Constitution only recently
came into effect on 18 May 2010, three years after its enactment. Before then there were no
procedures laid out for a  referendum on a constitutional amendment. At the local  level,
there are more options for direct citizen participation, however the result of a vote is not
legally  binding.  This working  paper aims to describe  the different mechanisms  of  direct
democracy in Japan, at the  national as well as  local level, to present  their legal  basis and
frequency of use  and to discuss developments  since the late 1990s primarily at  the local
level.
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1. Introduction
Japan is a representative democracy with a parliamentary cabinet system and a limited
number of mechanisms for direct citizen participation. Political  participation  in  Japan
basically consists of electing the members of the two chambers of the national parliament,
the upper and the lower house.1  Local level politics provides more options for direct citizen
participation.  All  Japanese  citizens  over  20  years  of  age  are  allowed  to  participate  in
elections.
According to the Japanese Constitution (JC) a nationwide  referendum must be held as  the
last phase of a  process of constitutional revision (Article  96)  or in  order  to  confirm the
mandate of  Supreme Court judges (Article 79). Japan does not provide for any bottom-up
mechanisms of direct democracy at a national level (Serdült/Welp 2012). In regard to local
level  options,  chapter 8 of the JC  (Articles 92-95) lists  the possibilities for  local self-
governance.2 The Local Autonomy Law (LAL; chihō jichi-hō)3 describes them in more detail.
Articles 74 to 88 are the cornerstones  of local  direct democracy in Japan.4 In a nutshell,
citizens’ initiated referendums and local level initiatives are possible for constituencies that
provide for them in legislation.
As in many other countries, especially in Middle and Eastern Europe, the beginning of direct
democratic participation in Japan started in the 1990s. At this time, some western European
countries  and US states  were already looking  back on a 100 year  old  tradition of  direct
democracy. Worldwide, there was a great increase in the use of referendums in the latter
half of the 20th century (see: Altman 2011).
Recently, political participation in Japan has undergone some changes. Since the mid-1990s,
local citizens' movements have become  increasingly active and are  making use of  direct
democracy mechanisms. With the post-war constitution and principles of local autonomy, a
new local government system was introduced, which, over time, has been given increased
legal leeway. 
1 Article 43(1), Japanese Constitution.
2 Local  parliaments  were  introduced  after the  Meiji  Restoration  of  1868.  The  Meiji Government
abolished the fiefs (Han) of feudal lords (daimyos) and established prefectures (Fu or Ken) in 1871. In
the  so-called  sanshinpō-law  (lit.  'three  new  laws')  of  1878,  the  still  valid  division  of  Japan  into
prefectures  (ken) and cities  (shi) was introduced: the Municipalities Formation Law (Gunku-choson-
henseiho), the Prefectural Assemblies Act (Fukenkai-kisoku) and the Local Tax Ordinance (Chihozei-
kisoku) were enacted. Under the Prefectural Assemblies Act, a prefectural assembly was established in
each prefecture. In 1888 the City Organisation Law (Shi-sei) and the Town and Village Organisation Law
(Choson-sei) were enacted and in 1890 the Prefectural Organisation Law (Fuken-sei) and the County
Organisation Law (Gun-sei) were enacted. Counties are further subdivided into towns (chō or machi)
and villages (son or mura).
3 The Local Autonomy Law (Chiho jichi ho) was passed as Law No. 67 on 17 April 1947.
4 The  articles  establish most of Japan's contemporary local government structures, including
prefectures and municipalities. Local Referendum Law (in Japanese):
http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S22/S22HO067.html (accessed 9 December 2014).
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However,  as citizens'  initiatives  are  not  expressly  provided  for under  Japanese  law, the
development of existing forms of direct  participation have yet to find expression in a legal
form. Furthermore, there is debate as to whether local referendums can be legally binding
(Neumann 2002).5
At the  local level, the LAL allows  for the  recall of  mayors or members of local parliament.
This Act focuses on the local level petitions filed between 1979 and 2009 and suggests that
although referendums might be heavily restricted, they nonetheless play a significant role in
Japanese politics.
The paper will be organised into four sections: in the first section, we discuss the historical
and conceptual background of citizen  participation in Japan; in  the second we present  the
legal status of referendums at the national and local level; and in the third we look at the use
of  referendums and their direct influence at  the  local level. In the final section we discuss
some current issues of local referendums in Japan.
2. Terminology and Origins
2.1 Terminology
During Japan's modernisation in the Meiji era, from the end of the 19th to the beginning of
the 20th century, there was a great need for the translation of Western terms that simply did
not exist in the  Japanese language. Words such as  democracy,  initiative and  referendum
were adapted phonetically and transcribed with Sino-Japanese characters. For example, the
Japanese word for democracy 'Minsyu-syugi'  or 'Minsyusei' is composed of the two parts
'Min' for 'people' and 'Syu' for 'sovereign'.  Acceptance of these Western terms can be seen
as one of the key elements for the introduction of democratic ideas in Japan in the two
decades after the Russo-Japanese war (1904-05). There were numerous debates about the
concept of democracy, its meaning, interpretation and attempts at  adaptation to  Japanese
standards. This is  evident by  the fact  that at the beginning of the 20th century different
translations for the Western term "democracy" existed (Meyer 2002).6
The term direct democracy first appeared in Japan at the beginning of the 20th century. Abe
Isoo, one of the founders of the Japanese Social Democratic party and a professor of Waseda
University in Tokyo, introduced it in 1904 in his work chijō no risōkoku - Suisu ("Ideal State on
the  Earth - Switzerland") using  the expression chokusetsu rippō sei (lit. 'direct legislation')
and explained the Swiss institutions of referendum and initiative. In  1902 Kōtoku Shūsui,
who was a journalist and socialist in the Meiji era, illustrated in his article Chokusetsu sansei
ron (an essay on direct political participation) the importance of popular votes, referendums
and initiatives. Aside from Shinkichi Uesugis' (who was a professor at the University of Tokyo)
paper Referendumsmu ni tsuite (About the referendum), we  should  also  mention  the
monograph by Matasuke Kawamura  (Professor  at  Kyusyu  University). Kawamura's 1934
published piece Chokusetsu minshu seiji (Direct Democratic Politics) has to be seen as one of
the first Japanese works  on  direct democracy (Okamoto 2004). However, throughout the
5 According to Takehana (1997):  "In principle, about such kind of regulations a lawfully referendum
could be carried out, but not on issues that concern the policy measures (seisaku) of the local or even
national government".
6 Yoshino Sakuzō, a well-known advocate of democratic ideas in this period distinguishes between two
basic meanings of the Western concept  of democracy. The terms "minshushugi" government by the
people and "minponshugi" government for the people (Meyer 2002).
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rising militarism of the Meiji  and under the pre-war laws, the concept of direct democracy
was only known amongst a few intellectuals.
At this time, the terms referendum and initiative were translated in many different ways. For
'referendum' the terms chokusetsu rippōken, refarendamu (written in Katakana), or Isoo
Abe's chokusetsu rippō sei (lit. direct legislation) were often  used. Different terms with
different ways of writing (in different Chinese characters) were used, or newly invented. For
example, Abe created his own translation kengiken (the right of presenting a petition). Based
on these linguistic and historical circumstances, Japan has developed a unique terminology
to name the different referendums at the different state levels. Most Japanese scholars refer
today to a national vote as kokumin tōhyō (national referendum) and to a local vote as jūmin
tōhyō (resident referendum) instead of kōmin tōhyō (citizen referendum). Jūmin means
residents and tōhyō means voting. The reasons lie in pre-war history. Under the Meiji
Constitution the term kōmin (citizen) only referred to a male possessing a certain amount of
property. This is one of the reasons why most Japanese scholars still decline to use the term
‘citizen’.  For  some  politicians  only  well-educated  persons  with  property  are  'citizens'.
Therefore, in their view there are not many 'citizens' in that narrow sense in Japan. Until
today, the most frequently  used term for democracy, besides the syllabary demokurashi, is
the expression minshushugi (Hwang 2009). Because referendums have been held mostly at
the prefectural or local level, shimin tōhyō (vote of the city-citizens) and kenmin tōhyō (voting
of the prefecture residents) are also common (see: Meyer 2005).
2.2 Origins
Even if democratic  elements in Japan may have been present before the Meiji era (1886-
1912), as Inoguchi (2003) shows, before the introduction  of the Western parliamentary
system there was no specific concept of democracy (Kuroda 2005). The Constitution of the
Greater Japanese Empire from 11 February 1889 did not contain any articles regarding local
autonomy or direct democracy since such ideas conflicted with the Emperor's divinity. Before
1926,  governors  and  mayors were appointed by the Ministry  of  the  Interior and local
governments merely functioned as branch offices of the central government (Kaneko 2004).
Between 1926 and 1943, mayors were elected by the city parliament but after 1943 the
mayor was once again appointed by the Ministry of the Interior. Japan laid out the basis for a
democratic state with a new constitution in April 1947. The new constitution, executed by an
American committee based on a Japanese draft, met the established requirements  for  a
constitutional amendment and was formally adopted as an amendment to the existing Meiji
Constitution. However, its content was radically different to the previous version and was
closely linked to Japan’s surrender at the end of World War II.
In this new constitution, local self-government (chihō jichitai) and local autonomy were
established alongside a democratic parliamentary system and universal suffrage. Under the
new system, governors and mayors were elected directly  by the people and two types of
mandatory referendum were introduced.
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Article 95 of the JC states that a special law, targeting a specific  local entity, requires the
consent of a majority of voters of that particular entity.7 It was introduced by US lawmakers
as a counterpart to the strongly centralised Japanese government.
Article 96 of  the  JC  established a compulsory nationwide referendum for constitutional
amendments. Since 1949, the  LAL  has already been changed  more than fifty times.  In
contrast, the JC has remained unchanged since it came into force in 1947. This is due to the
procedure for constitutional amendment. A  bill  which  is  passed  by  the  House  of
Representatives and upon which the House of Councillors makes a decision different from
that of the House of Representatives, becomes a law when passed a second time by the
House of Representatives by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present (see
JC:  Art.  55,  57(1),  58(2),  59(2)  and  96(1)).  Article  96(1)  states:  Amendments  to  this
Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of
all  the  members  of  each  House  and  shall  thereupon  be  submitted  to  the  people  for
ratification.
It was around the 1970s, with the appearance  of city planning movements (machizukuri),
and environmental movements that the origins of Japanese participatory democracy can be
found (Numata 2006). One of the most influential forerunners of direct democratic processes
in Japan was the movement against environmental pollution of the late 1960s and early
1970s that was politically independent and involved all levels of society. The development of
a civil rights movement, the end of the Cold War, globalisation, internationalisation and the
rise of NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations), enhanced citizen participation in political
decision-making processes. In the 1980s and 1990s the demand for popular referendums in
Japan increased dramatically amid growing tension and conflicts between citizens and local
authorities. In the 1980s tension between residents and regional governments increased
because of construction of nuclear power plants, US military  bases and landfills. In 1982 a
first referendum in Kubokawa, Kochi Prefecture on the building of a nuclear power plant was
authorised. However, the referendum did not actually take place and the project was never
realised (Takao 2007). There were further referendum attempts which were dismissed by the
local authorities. For example, in  Zushi, Kanagawa Prefecture in 1984, there was a petition
for a referendum from two-fifths of voters against the construction of US troop
accommodation. The petition was rejected by authorities on the ground that "local
referendums would disturb efficiency and operations of representative democracy at
municipal level, which is the basis of local autonomy" (Yorimoto 1994). In the two decades
from 1979 to 1999,  local  legislatures  rejected more than 90% of petitions. From the
approximately 100 demands only seven were approved and only six were actually conducted
(Imai 2000).
7 Article 95 was already part of a first draft of the new JC, prepared by the General Headquarter under
General McArthur and presented to the Japanese Government on 13 February 1946, as Article 88:
Article LXXXVIII. The Diet shall pass no local or special act applicable to a metropolitan area, city or
town where a general act can be made applicable, unless it be made subject to the acceptance of a
majority of the electorate of such community  (http://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/img_l/105/105-
019l.html (accessed 2 December 2014).
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3. National Level
3.1 Constitutional referendums (Mandatory referendum)
According to Article 96 of the JC, an amendment of the constitution initiated by the Diet
requires  a two-thirds or  more majority  in both Houses. After that the proposal shall be
submitted to the people for approval and requires only a majority of yes votes and no
quorum. Once ratified, amendments shall immediately be enacted by the Emperor in the
name of the people. Up until now, such a vote on constitutional amendments has never
been held.
Notwithstanding that  the  constitution  requires  a mandatory national popular vote for  a
constitutional amendment, no explicit statute existed until 14 May 2007 when an act on the
amendment procedure of the Constitution of Japan  (Nihonkoku-kenpo  no kaiseitetuduki  ni
kansuru  horitsu),  namely  the  National  Referendum  Law  for  the  Amendment  of  the
Constitution  (kenpō  kaisei  kokumin  tōhyō hō)  was  passed. A constitutional amendment
proposal is only allowed to concern one issue. For a proposal to become a bill, a two-thirds
majority in each House is required. After its passage the bill has to be put to a vote within 60
to 180 days. The voting age is 18 years rather than 20 years as with other national elections.
In national referendum campaigns all government employees are prohibited from using
resources associated with their status in any campaign for or against national referendums.
Two weeks prior to voting, television and radio advertising becomes very restricted.
The National Referendum Law for the Amendment of the Constitution came into force three
years after its enactment and the panels set up to examine the Constitution did not consider
or submit any amendments during that period. Therefore, a national popular referendum on
a constitutional amendment was possible from 18 May 2010. The law does not grant people
the right to really decide on substantive issues. It only applies to referendums  on
constitutional amendments and does not provide possibilities for popular votes on other
matters (Hwang 2009).
The origin of the desire to implement these procedures after 50 years has to be seen in the
desire to amend the JC,  in particular Article 9, which permanently renounces war. 8 When
Japan sent forces to Iraq and allowed some of its navy ships to  patrol around Somalia, it
aroused controversy over the constitutionality  of  those  actions. However, even if an
amendment of Article 9 is essential for the development of a more self-contained foreign
policy, a constitutional referendum in the near future would be surprising. Among the major
political parties only the Liberal Democratic Party is in favour of an amendment; the Social
Democrats and Communists are clearly against.
8 Article 9 JC (Chapter 2: Renunciation of War):
(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of
settling international disputes.
(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as
other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized.
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3.2 Review of Supreme Court Judges (Mandatory Referendum)
According to Article 79 of the Constitution, the appointment of Supreme Court judges shall
be reviewed by the people at the general election of the  members of the House of
Representatives. After a period of 10 years the appointment shall be reviewed again at the
first available  general election of the members of the House of Representatives. If the
majority of voters are in favour of dismissal of a judge, he or she shall be dismissed. The
popular vote has the function of  reviewing the appointment by Cabinet, dismissing
unqualified judges and also strengthening the legitimacy of the appointed judges. Article 79
also states that the  Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such number of
justices as may be determined by law; all such justices except the Chief Justice9 shall be
appointed by the Cabinet. 
There has never been a vote in favour of the dismissal of a Supreme Court justice.  With
respect to judges in general, only around 10 percent of votes have ever been in favour of
dismissal. This is why many scholars have expressed doubts about the real function of such
reviews (Hwang 2009). Watson (2006: 106) notes that,  “[...] following the practice in some
US states, that Supreme Court judges be approved in a referendum coinciding with the first
general election after their appointment and every ten years afterwards. No Supreme Court
judge has ever been disapproved and some criticise this system for being an almost empty
routine [...]”.
3.3 Optional Referendum
Under existing laws in Japan, optional referendums are not provided for at the national level.
3.4 Citizens' Initiative
Citizens' initiatives are not provided for at the national level and there is currently no strong
public movement in support of their introduction.
4. Subnational Level
Japan has no  national referendum legislation for local entities. If a municipality intends to
hold a local referendum (either proposed by the mayor, members of the assembly, or
initiated by citizens), it first has to pass a local referendum ordinance to provide a legal basis.
The basis for such an ordinance is Article 74 of LAL. According to Article 74, a petition for a
referendum ordinance, just like all petitions, requires signatures from at least one-fiftieth of
the electorate. However, whether such a bill for a local referendum ordinance is passed or
not is  decided  by  the local assembly  (though  the  mayor  can  issue  a  recommendation)
(Hwang 2009).  If local legislation rejects a direct demand, a referendum cannot be held.
Referendums results are not legally binding. Ordinances state that the mayor must respect
(sonchō suru) the referendum result. In fact, the Ministry of Home Affairs (so named until
2000, now: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications) reportedly instructed mayors
not to use the term "comply" after a case where a citizen attempted to include the explicit
statement that the mayor must comply with the referendum result. Because the term
"respect" is vague, some mayors actually respect and comply with the outcome while others
make a gesture of respect but disregard the outcome. Residents of Nago, Okinawa Prefecture
sued the city in January 1998 for disregarding the result of a referendum (a plan to build a US
military heliport). The suit was dismissed by the Naha District Court in 2000, on the grounds
that the result of a referendum is not legally binding. The presiding judge further stated that
9 The Chief Justice is designated by Cabinet and formally appointed by the Emperor.
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if outcomes were made binding, it would be inconsistent with the principle of indirect
democracy.10 Hwang (2009) calls this the most significant type of popular vote on a
substantive issue in recent years. The first local referendum that was actually carried out on
the basis of its own ad-hoc, provisional, local referendum act was held in Maki-machi (Niigata
Prefecture) and marked a new era in Japan (see chapter on Issues of local referendums).
Following this  referendum, the number of local votes with  a  similar basis increased
significantly. 
Because of the lack of a national statutory basis, in 2000 Takahama (Aichi Prefecture) passed
the first permanent referendum ordinance (jōsetsu-gata jūmin tōhyō jōrei11) in Japan. In the
next few years several local communities followed and by  December 2010 over 42  local
entities had passed ordinances (see Annex 1). The diverse permanent ordinances differ in
regard to eligibility of voters, number of required signatures and the time limit for collecting
signatures. Most agree however, that a referendum is void if the turnout is less than 50% of
the city's eligible voters. Unfortunately, the lack of a basic national law for local referendums,
which regulates local popular votes, undermines the binding force of such referendum
decisions (Takeda 2003).
Japan's 47 sub-national political entities (ken) are divided into several cities (shi), towns (chō
or machi) and villages (son or mura). According to their legal basis, which can be found in the
JC and LAL, the direct political participation forms in these roughly 1700 municipalities can
be divided into four categories:
4.1 Referendum for enactment of special law applicable to one local public entity
According to Article 95 of the JC, any special law applicable to one specific local body only
may not be enacted without the compliance of the majority of the entity. So the national
parliament can only propose a special law applicable to a specific local public body. A draft
for such laws must be submitted to a referendum (mandatory referendum) that requires
acceptance by the majority of the concerned local entity.
On the  basis of Article 95 of the  JC there have been 19 votes (see Annex 2)  in different
autonomous bodies, including cities and towns (shi, chō or machi). All were  held between
1949 and 1951. In 1952 the US General Headquarter left Japan and no further votes were
ever held based on Article 95. The votes concerned the provision of financial support to local
autonomous bodies (for  example, Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law).
Because these laws did not limit the power of local autonomous bodies or increase their
burdens, many scholars argue that these practices might have contradicted the original idea
of Article 95 (Hwang 2009).
10 The Japan Times, 10 May 2000: http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20000510a5.html
11 Jōrei stands not only for a subtype of normative laws but may also have the power to delegate the
legislative enactment procedure from the legislator to the executive. The right  has  statutory
authorisation (e.g. Article 92ff JC). Seikyū has a bigger political influence as a pure petition (seigan)
and has to be considered by the political decision-making  body (clear legitimate classification)
(Degenhart 1994).
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4.2 Recall and dissolution votes
There are three  types  of  recall  that  require  a  binding  vote if one-third  or  more  of  the
electorate12 support it:
1. Dissolution of the local assembly (Article 76(3) LAL)
2. Recall of an individual member of the assembly (Article 80(3) LAL)
3. Recall of the mayor (Article 81(2) LAL)
A popular vote called "recall tōhyō" is held a proposal, with approval requiring a majority of
valid votes favouring recall  or dismissal. Although some authors claim that recall had not
been practiced in Japan before 1996 (Hwang 2009 / Takao 2007), between 1947 and 2012
there were 1518 cases of all three types of recall and dissolution (excluding the 13 demands
to recall important public servants such as Shibuya-ku, Tokyo, 1953 and Zushi-chi, Kanagawa,
1986).13
Recall – the dismissal of elected officials – is often used as a last resort. Recalled officials are
eligible to run for the office from which they have just been dismissed. Also it appears to be
more difficult  to collect signatures for a recall. For example in Kobe in  1999, signatures of
more than one third of all eligible voters were collected for a petition demanding a local
referendum ordinance on the construction of a new airport. After the mayor disregarded the
demand for a referendum, the electorate began the collection of signatures to recall him,
however they did not manage to collect the required number. Conversely,  as the example of
Maki-machi in 1996 showed, the recall of the mayor can be a tool in the political struggle for
the implementation of a referendum. It took a new mayor, who supported a popular vote on
the construction of a nuclear power plant, for a referendum to be held (Numata 2006).
There is a fourth type of recall which does not lead to a vote. It allows the recall of important
public servants, such as the vice-governor, vice-mayor and school committees. The electorate
can propose the recall but only parliament can decide.
4.3 Petitions
4.3.1 Petition to enact, revise or abolish local ordinances
The 1947 Local Autonomy Law introduced the system on direct demands in Japan. After the
establishment of the direct demand system, citizens enthusiastically put it into practice by
demanding the abolishment of  local taxes (on electricity or gas). In 18 local entities (seven
prefectures; 11 municipalities) more than the required 2% or more of all the eligible voters'
signatures were collected. In response, the central government revised the law in 1948 and
exempted the levy or collection of local taxes or the collection of assessments, charges or
12 Until September 2012, where the electorate is under 400,000, signatures from 1/3 of the electorate
is required; an electorate over 400,000 requires signatures from 1/6. From September 2012 (following
amendment to LAL), an electorate under 400,000 requires signatures from 1/3; an electorate between
400,000 and 800,000 requires signatures from 1/6; and over 800,000 requires signatures from 1/8.
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fees from being the subject of  direct demands (Kaneko 2004; committee report discussion
paper, source http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000087295.pdf).
According to Article 74 of LAL, citizens also have the  right to initiate a direct demand
(chokusetsu seikyū) for the enactment, amendment or abolition of a local ordinance (jōrei)
with the collection of signatures from one-fiftieth or more of eligible voters. The demand
(seikyū) is handled by the responsible local parliament who is free to accept or reject it. From
1947 to 2012, 1,851 petitions, consisting of 109 petitions in prefectures and 1,742 petitions
in municipalities, were referred to local parliaments (MHA/MIC “chihojichi geppo, No.6-9, 12,
23, 29, 37, 38, 41-43, 45-56). In fact, prefectural parliaments have rejected 107 (99.1%) of
the  108 petitions and municipality parliaments have rejected 1,520 (93.5%) of  the  1,742
petitions.
4.3.2 Petition to audit local government activities
Citizens also have the right to call for an inspection of the administration of local affairs with
the collection of signatures from one-fiftieth of eligible voters (Article 75 LAL). These results
must be publicly released by the auditors. 
4.3.3 Petition by citizens for audit
Article 242 of LAL states that an individual citizen has the right to a hearing if the citizen has
reason to believe that public funds have been embezzled or the sale or purchase of property
and the formation or fulfilling of a contract is illegal or improperly executed (petition for
audit by residents). If the  citizen is not satisfied with the result of an audit,  the citizen can
institute legal proceedings called a  "citizen lawsuit" (jūmin soshō) or "taxpayer lawsuit"
(nōzeisha soshō). This is similar to a taxpayer lawsuit in the US.
4.4 Conference of municipalities in case of a merger (“legal merger conference”)
As mentioned above, Japan has adopted a two-tiered local administration system consisting
of prefectures and municipalities. The number  of  municipalities has decreased  quite
dramatically from 71,314 in 1888 to 1,719 in 2011. The decrease occurred  over  three
consolidation periods. The first was “the Great Meiji Consolidation” 1888-1889, when the
number of municipalities was reduced from 71,314 to 15,859. In  the “Great Showa
Consolidation" from  1953 to 1961, the number of municipalities decreased from 9,868 to
3,472. Finally, during the “Great Heisei Consolidation” from 1999 to the end of March 2010,
the number was reduced from 3,229 to 1,756 (Yokomichi 2007).
The reason for  this  latest  consolidation was the  attempt by the central government to
strengthen the administrative and financial  foundation of municipalities. With the
Decentralisation  Reform  of  2000, parts of the central government’s  authority were
transferred to local governments. At the core of this reform was the law for the abolition of
the delegation  of  national  government tasks to the  governor, mayor and administrative
committees (kikan i'nin jimu seido no haishi) and a restriction of central government
interference in regional affairs (Klein 2006).  These last  two laws from 1999 and 2000 with
their financial incentives were the initiatives responsible for the  area mergers of the last
decade.
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In addition, national government encouraged mergers  by passing a law called  the  Law
Concerning Special Provisions for the Merger of Municipalities14 which in Article 4(11) made
it  possible for citizens to initiate a referendum on  the  establishment  of  a  legal  merger
conference after collecting signatures of one-sixth of eligible voters. However, while this kind
of referendum vote was rarely held, consultative referendums on municipal mergers were
held much more often and in many municipalities. 
This last consolidation period is the main reason why in the  last decade the number of
realised local referendums increased dramatically. According  to  the  Ministry  of  Internal
Affairs and Communications, from July 1982 until the end of October 2010, 445 out of the
467  popular votes were about municipal  merger  conferences. Only 22 votes  concerned
another subject.15
5. Issues of local referendums
The issues that have resulted in demands for local referendums vary from building nuclear
power plants, waste disposal sites, dam or hospitals, to  reducing the number of municipal
assembly members and constructing off-track betting shops for horse or boat racing (Jichi
Rippō Kenkyūkai 2003). However, those  finally approved by the local authority almost all
concerned the construction or removal of troublesome facilities (meiwaku shisetsu)  from
communities, such as nuclear power and industrial waste plants, quarry expansions and US
military bases. They can be summarised under the umbrella term "NIMBY" (Not In My Back
Yard). Even though citizens have NIMBY attitudes about almost every kind of city
development close to them, the term commonly refers to citizens’ attitude towards
developments considered dirty or dangerous such as airports, roads, power plants, prisons
and landfills (Igarashi 2005).
The rise of referendums indicates that Japanese residents are increasingly paying more
attention to environmental problems and are not satisfied with the way their representatives
handle issues. Local referendum attempts often come from Seikatsusha networks founded in
the early 1980s. These small groups or networks, consisting  mainly of women from local
communities,  are devoted to issues concerning the  environment,  social welfare and
education. They try to defend their communities through the use of local referendums (see:
Tsubogo 2009).
The pioneer example of local referendum decisions is the vote on the establishment of a
nuclear power plant in Maki-machi held on 4 August 1996. It was the first citizens’ initiated
vote to be accepted by a municipal council. The result of this referendum was less about the
decision on the nuclear power plant and more about the detection of the problems in the
Japanese local referendum system. Immediately after the referendum, the Directory General,
Agency of Natural Resources and Energy stated that in accordance with national energy
14 The law concerning special provisions for the merger of municipalities, the so-called Special Merger
Law (Shichoson gappei tokurei ho), was enacted as a piece of temporary legislation for a period of 10
years in 1965 and was extended every 10 years until 2005. The Special Merger Law was revised by the
Omnibus Law for Decentralisation (Chihō Bunken Ikkatsu hō ) in 2000, with the biggest changes being
financial  incentives  and  the  extension  by  the  central  government  of  subsidies  for  merged
municipalities from five to 10 years. The revised law expired in 2005, at which time a new municipal
merger law was enacted.
15 Committee discussion paper, MIC: http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000087297.pdf
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policy the project to build a power plant in Maki-machi would continue even though citizens
voted by  more than  60% (turnout 88%) against the  construction. The Ministry of Home
Affairs declared in November 1996 that "the result has no binding function for the national
government or other regional authorities". Despite these statements, the referendum had a
great impact on other local governments, the central government and the Japanese people.
By the beginning of 2000, 10 referendums had been conducted on a range of controversial
NIMBY issues: the construction of rubbish incinerators, nuclear facilities, US military  bases
and a proposed US military heliport in Okinawa, and massive public works, especially dams
(Takao 1999) (See: Annex 3).
But NIMBY issues represent only a fraction of all the issues raised by petitions. Therefore, it is
misleading to state that increasing demand for popular referendums reflects the citizens
concern about NIMBY phenomena. The reason why referendums about NIMBY topics are so
dominant lies with the local legislatures, who are responsible for selecting the issues and
placing them on the ballot. With increasing financial constraints and decreasing subsidies,
local legislatures more and more resent such government-imposed projects. For the planning
and  construction  of  nuclear power plants the central government (and in the  case of
industrial waste plants, the prefectures) is in charge. In fact, most of  the local legislatures
had already expressed their opposition to such projects before the initiation of the
referendum movement. Local authorities might be opposed to a national government-
imposed project, but they cannot stop the construction of a national or central governmental
project on their own. However, if a popular referendum declares "no" to a certain project,
the position of the local government is strengthened. In this way, the increasing number of
referendums reflects the conflict between local and central governments and the trend
towards a more decentralised state. Many referendums resulted in the  cancellation of the
project, or if it was not immediately cancelled, the prefectural or central government were
often forced to postpone the project indefinitely and announce its cancellation many years
later.
Not every referendum has  had these effects. In Kobayashi, Miyazaki Prefecture, where
citizens voted in  1997 against the construction of an industrial waste plant, the governor
ignored the outcome. Construction started long before the referendum and the plant was
ready for operation less than eight months after the referendum was held. With regard to
referendums concerning US military bases  (Okinawa Prefecture  in 1996;   Nago,  Okinawa
Prefecture in 1997; Iwakuni, Yamaguchi Prefecture in 2006) it must be noted that the central
government did little to alleviate the burden to  those areas. If national security or treaty
obligations are in question, the effect of popular referendums in Japan is quite insignificant.
6. Conclusion
As outlined above, direct democracy appeared in Japan from the mid-1990s, though in an
incomplete  form. Up until now, referendums on a national level have  all concerned the
review of justices of the Supreme Court. Local popular votes, however, have covered diverse
issues  and  are not uncommon. Since the mid-1990s, these referendums have  become
popular among local activists and the expansion of local self-government in recent years has
offered new opportunities for citizens to shape their immediate environment. Though the
barrier for recall is considerable, especially in large cities where signatures of one-third of the
electorate are required, because campaigners have to work hard to collect signatures, voters’
interest is high. Therefore, when held, the turnout in local referendums is high. 
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Recently however, voter interest in referendums has decreased. The 2013 referendum on the
construction of a prefecture road in Tokyo had a turnout of only around 35%, clearly failing
to reach the 50% quorum demanded by the mayor.
Table 1: Overview of direct democracy mechanisms in Japan
Instrument Level Legal basis Number of votes
Mandatory constitutional
referendum National Art. 96 JC 0
Mandatory legislative
referendum for local entity acts Local Art. 95 JC
19
(see Annex 2)
Recall Local Art. 76-3, 80-3, 81-2 LAL 1,518(see chapter 4.2)
Citizens’ initiative to local
parliament Local Art. 74 LAL
1,851
(see chapter 4.3.1)





Provisions for the Merger of
Municipalities, Art. 4-14, 5-




The citizens’ initiated referendum as an instrument to decide on issues of public policy is still
limited in Japan. In general, referendum results based on the local referendum ordinance are
non-binding. Collecting the necessary number of signatures and securing a majority of the
votes in a referendum do not guarantee a change in policy. The weakness of referendums as
an instrument of policy-making is not only due to a lack of resources of activists, but also to
the legal position of referendums in Japan. The LAL subordinates referendums to the system
of representative democracy by declaring the results of a referendum to be generally non-
binding. Today, local referendums play a consultative role for the government to see and
experience the emotions of citizens on a certain issue. Though Japanese direct democracy
has similarities to consultative referendums (Vogt 2001), the Japanese model is more
complex. None of the previous popular votes were a pure survey. Even if prefectural and
central governments are not required to comply with the outcome of a popular referendum,
it still does send a strong signal. Considering the possibility of protests and outrage, local
governments rarely  choose to disregard a referendum outcome. Referendums in Japan can
improve the responsibility of local authorities significantly.
Grassroots movements have supported popular referendums at the local level, appealed for
a  rethinking of centralised government and stopped some unnecessary public works and
infrastructure projects in local communities by local and central governments. This links to
the distinct Japanese political system and culture, in particular pork barrel politics. However,
the direct democratic participation forms in Japan are still, compared to other countries,
weak and uninfluential. This may be due to three reasons: a lack of resources, the weak legal
position and the centralised nature of the Japanese state (Vogt 2001). A first step in popular
referendums playing a more substantial role was the enactment of permanent referendum
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ordinances (jōsetsu-gata jūmin tōhyō jōrei) in certain municipalities. A next bigger step
would be a legally binding referendum. Nevertheless, to Takeda (1993), such a mechanism
would be unconstitutional. Takeda  states that with the institutionalisation of local
referendums,  a fundamental reform of the relationship between central and local
government should run  alongside. A local referendum process preserving the interests of
local residents and safeguarding the will of the local community would definitely need more
decentralisation at the administrative level, in particular the delegation of decision-making
authority to local governments.
In view of citizens’ referendums in recent years, the abundance of Japanese literature opens
the  floor for further studies on direct political participation in Japan. Furthermore,  the
development of national referendums (National Referendum Law for the Change of the
Constitution) and the divide between government and citizens is to be observed with
interest.
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Annex 1: Municipalities with a permanent referendum ordinance
Municipality Prefecture Parliament Entry into force
Takahama-shi Aichi 24-Jun-02 1-Sep-02
Fujimi-shi Saitama 19-Dec-02 20-Dec-02
Kamisato-machi Saitama 20-Jan-03 1-Apr-03
Hiroshima-shi Hiroshima 19-Mar-03 1-Sep-03
Misato-machi Saitama 25-Mar-03 1-Apr-03
Kiryu-shi Gunma 20-Jun-03 1-Jul-03
Hodatsu-shimizu-machi Ishikawa 25-Sep-03 1-Jan-04
Otake-shi Hiroshima 22-Dec-03 1-Jun-04
Abiko-shi Chiba 17-Mar-04 1-Apr-04
Sakado-shi Saitama 22-Mar-04 1-Apr-04
Minamiizu-cho Shizuoka 21-Sep-04 21-Sep-04
Hatoyama-machi Saitama 16-Dec-04 17-Dec-04*
Mashike-cho Hokkaido 21-Dec-04 22-Dec-04
Kishiwada-shi Osaka 22-Jun-05 1-Aug-05
Nabari-shi Mie 20-Dec-05 1-Jan-06
Zushi-shi Kanagawa 1-Mar-06 1-Apr-06
Yamato-shi Kanagawa 24-Mar-06 1-Oct-06
Sanyo-onoda-shi Yamaguchi 27-Mar-06 1-Jul-06
Houfu-shi Yamaguchi 5-Oct-06 1-Dec-06
Engaru-cho Hokkaido 7-Mar-07 1-Apr-07
Engaru-cho Hokkaido 12-Mar-07 1-Apr-07
Isshiki-machi Aichi 13-Mar-07 1-Jul-07
Isshiki-cho Aichi 16-Mar-07 1-Jul-07
Oumihachiman-shi Shiga 22-Mar-07 30-Mar-08
Ohmihachiman-shi Shiga 30-Mar-07 30-Mar-07
Usuki-shi Oita 22-Jun-07 1-Apr-08
Usuki-shi Oita 22-Jun-07 1-Apr-08
Toyo-cho Kochi 26-Jun-07 26-Jun-07
Wajima-shi Ishikawa 14-Dec-07 1-Apr-08
Wajima-shi Ishikawa 14-Dec-07 1-Apr-08
Wakkanai-shi Hokkaido 1-Mar-08 1-Apr-08
Wakkanai-shi Hokkaido 21-Mar-08 1-Apr-08
Hokuei-cho Tottori 21-Mar-08 1-Oct-08
Hokuei-cho Tottori 25-Mar-08 1-Oct-08
Toyonaka-shi Osaka 1-Apr-08 26-Mar-09
Miyako-shi Iwate 13-Jun-08 1-Jul-08
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Municipality Prefecture Parliament Entry into force
Kawasaki-shi Kanagawa 19-Jun-08 1-Apr-09
Ashibetsu-shi Hokkaido 20-Jun-08 1-Oct-08
Ashibetsu-shi Hokkaido 20-Jun-08 1-Oct-08
Kawasaki-shi Kanagawa 24-Jun-08 1-Apr-09
Miyako-shi Iwate 27-Jun-08 1-Jul-08
Kitahiroshima-shi Hokkaido 26-Feb-09 1-Jun-09
Shikokuchuo-shi Ehime 25-Mar-09 1-Jul-09
Shikoku-chuo-shi Ehime 26-Mar-09 1-Jul-09
Joetsu-shi Niigata 27-Mar-09 1-Oct-09
Joetsu-shi Niigata 27-Mar-09 1-Oct-09
Kiso-machi Nagano 31-Mar-09 1-Apr-09
Oushu-shi Iwate 8-Sep-09 1-Oct-09
Oushu-shi Iwate 14-Sep-09 1-Oct-09
Tajimi-shi Gifu 14-Dec-09 1-Apr-10
Yasu-shi Shiga 22-Dec-09 Not yet
Tajimi-shi Gifu 25-Dec-09 1-Apr-10
Takizawa-mura Iwate 19-Mar-10 1-Oct-10
Hakui-shi Ishikawa 19-Mar-10 1-Oct-10
Kama-shi Fukuoka 21-Dec-10 10-Dec
Komoro-shi Nagano 21-Dec-10 10-Dec
* revised 15-Dec-06
** excluding 
Source: Okamoto (2012: 120).
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Annex 2: The 19 votes according to the Local Autonomy Special Law





Hiroshima-shi Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Act 1949.05.11 1949.07.07 65.0 91.9 1949.08.06
Nagasaki-shi Nagasaki International Cultural City Construction Act 1949.05.11 1949.07.07 73.5 98.6 1949.08.09
Beppu-shi Act on Construction of Beppu as City of International Tourism and Hot Springs Culture 1950.04.07 1950.06.15 79.8 74.9 1950.07.18
Atami-shi Act on Construction of Atami as City of International Tourism and Hot Springs Culture 1950.05.01 1950.06.28 60.4 82.8 1950.08.01
Ito-shi Act on Construction of Ito as City of International Tourism and Hot Springs Culture 1950.05.01 1950.06.15 55.0 64.1 1950.07.25
Tokyo-to Capital Construction Act 1950.04.22 1950.06.04 55.1 60.3 1950.06.28
Yokosuka-shi Act on Reconstruction of Cities that Formerly Served as Naval Ports 1950.04.11 1950.06.04 69.1 90.9 1950.06.28
Sasebo-shi Act on Reconstruction of Cities that Formerly Served as Naval Ports 1950.04.11 1950.06.04 89.0 97.3 1950.06.28
Kure-shi Act on Reconstruction of Cities that Formerly Served as Naval Ports 1950.04.11 1950.06.04 82.2 95.8 1950.06.28
Maizuru-shi Act on Reconstruction of Cities that Formerly Served as Naval Ports 1950.40.11 1950.06.04 75.4 84.6 1950.06.28
Kyoto-shi Act on Construction of Kyoto as City of International Culture and Tourism 1950.07.28 1950.09.20 31.5 69.4 1950.10.22
Nara-shi Act on Construction of Nara as City of International Culture and Tourism 1950.07.28 1950.09.20 73.5 74.1 1950.10.21
Yokohama-shi Act on Construction of Yokohama as International Port City 1950.07.30 1950.09.20 39.5 89.8 1950.10.21
Kobe-shi Act on Construction of Kobe as International Port City 1950.07.30 1950.09.20 43.3 84.4 1950.10.21
Matsue-shi Act on Construction of Matsue as City of International Culture and Tourism 1950.12.06 1951.02.10 73.3 75.9 1951.03.01
Ashiya-shi Act on Construction of Ashiya as City of International Culture with Good Residential Environment 1950.12.06 1951.02.11 56.3 77.7 1951.03.03
Matsuyama-shi Act on Construction of Matsuyama as City of International Tourism and Hot Springs Culture 1950.12.06 1951.02.11 56.5 83.5 1951.04.01
Karuizawa-machi Act on Construction of Karuizawa as Town of International Goodwill, Culture and Tourism 1951.05.29 1951.07.18 81.2 92.6 1951.08.15
Ito-shi Act on Partial Amendment of the Act on Construction of Ito as City of International Tourism and Hot Springs Culture 1952.06.20 1952.08.20 67.4 98.0 1952.09.22
Source: Kobayashi (2010: 78)
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Annex 3: 19 local referendums (1996-2010), excluding merger referendums
Date Issue Prefecture Municipality Initiator Turnout Yes %
4-Aug-96 Nuclear Power Plant Niigata Maki-machi MPs 88.20% 39%
8-Sep-96 Reduction of US Navy base Okinawa - Citizens 59.50% 89%
22-Jun-97 Industrial waste dumping ground Gifu Mitake-cho Citizens 87.50% 19%
16-Nov-97 Industrial waste dumping ground Miyazaki Kobayashi-shi Citizens 75.90% 40%
21-Dec-97 US Navy heliport Okinawa Nago-shi Citizens 82.50% 45%
8-Feb-98 Industrial waste dumping ground Okayama Yoshinaga-cho Citizens 91.70% 2%
14-Jun-98 Industrial waste dumping ground Miyagi Shiroishi-shi Mayor 71.00% 4%
30-Aug-98 Industrial waste dumping ground Chiba Unakami-machi Mayor 87.30% 2%
4-Jul-99 Quarry (expansion or new construction) Nagasaki Konagai-cho Mayor 67.80% 55%
23-Jan-00 Dam construction Tokushima Tokushima-shi MPs 55.00% 8%
27-May-01 Nuclear Power Plant Niigata Kariwa-mura Citizens 88.10% 43%
18-Nov-01 Nuclear Power Plant Mie Miyama-cho Mayor 88.60% 32%
26-Oct-03 Industrial waste dumping ground Kochi Hidaka-mura Citizens 79.80% 60%
23-Oct-05 City developing plan Chiba Sodegaura-shi Citizens 58.00% 64%
12-Mar-06 US base Yamaguchi Iwakuni-shi Mayor 58.70% 11%
9-Dec-07 Construction of citizen’s centre Chiba Yotsukaido-shi Citizens 47.60% 24%
27-Apr-08 Plan of stock farm Okinawa Izena-son Mayor 71.40% 50%
14-Nov-10 Construction of cultural centre Nagano Saku-shi Mayor 54.90% 29%
Source: Okamoto (2011: 310-311).
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